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Abstract
Resilience has become a critical problem for high performance computing. Checkpointing proto-
cols are often used for error recovery after fail-stop failures. However, silent errors cannot be ignored,
and their particularities is that such errors are identied only when the corrupted data is activated.
To cope with silent errors, we need a verication mechanism to check whether the application state
is correct. Checkpoints should be supplemented with verications to detect silent errors. When a
verication is successful, only the last checkpoint needs to be kept in memory because it is known to
be correct.
In this paper, we analytically determine the best balance of verications and checkpoints so as to
optimize platform throughput. We introduce a balanced algorithm using a pattern with p checkpoints
and q verications, which regularly interleaves both checkpoints and verications across same-size
computational chunks. We show how to compute the waste of an arbitrary pattern, and we prove
that the balanced algorithm is optimal when the platform MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) is
large in front of the other parameters (checkpointing, verication and recovery costs). We conduct
several simulations to show the gain achieved by this balanced algorithm for well-chosen values of
p and q, compared to the base algorithm that always perform a verication just before taking a
checkpoint ( p = q = 1), and we exhibit gains of up to 19%.
1 Introduction
With the advent of large-scale, massively parallel platforms, resilience has become a critical problem for
the HPC (High Performance Computing) community. Consider a large multicore node, say with one
thousand cores, and assume, somewhat optimistically, that its MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) is
as large as 100 years. The path to Exascale computing [7] is to assemble a platform composed of one
million such nodes. But with such a large number of nodes, the MTBF of the whole platform will only
be 52 minutes, which means that most applications running on the platform for a few hours or more will
experience a failure.
The de-facto general-purpose error recovery technique in high performance computing is checkpoint
and rollback recovery [5, 9]. Such protocols employ checkpoints to periodically save the state of a parallel
application, so that when an error strikes some process, the application can be restored into one of its
former states. There are several families of checkpointing protocols, but they share a common feature:
each checkpoint forms a consistent recovery line, i.e., when an error is detected, one can rollback to the
last checkpoint and resume execution, after a downtime and a recovery time.
However, checkpoint and rollback recovery assumes instantaneous error detection, and therefore apply
to fail-stop failures, such as for instance the crash of a resource. In this work, we revisit checkpoint
protocols in the context of silent errors, also called silent data corruption. In HPC, it has been shown
recently that such errors are not unusual, and must also be accounted for [17]. The cause may be for
instance soft eorts in L1 cache, or bit ips due to cosmic radiation. The problem is that the detection of
a silent error is not immediate, because the error is identied only when the corrupted data is activated.
1If the error stroke before the last checkpoint, and is detected after that checkpoint, then the checkpoint
is corrupted, and cannot be used to restore the application.
To solve this problem, one may envision to keep several checkpoints in memory, and to restore the
application from the last valid checkpoint, thereby rolling back to the last correct state of the applica-
tion [14]. This multiple-checkpoint approach has three major drawbacks. First, it is very demanding in
terms of stable storage: each checkpoint typically represents a copy of the entire memory footprint of
the application, which may well correspond to several terabytes. The second drawback is the possibility
of fatal failures. Indeed, if we keep k checkpoints in memory, the approach assumes that the error that is
currently detected did not strike before all the checkpoints still kept in memory, which would be fatal: in
that latter case, all live checkpoints are corrupted, and one would have to re-execute the entire application
from scratch. The probability of a fatal failure is evaluated in [1] for various error distribution laws and
values of k. The third drawback of the approach is the most serious, and applies even without memory
constraints, i.e., if we could store an innite number of checkpoints in storage. The critical question is to
determine which checkpoint is the last valid one. We need this information to safely recover from that
point on. However, because of the detection latency, we do not know when the silent error has indeed
occurred, hence we cannot identify the last valid checkpoint, unless some verication system is enforced.
The major objective of this paper is to introduce algorithms coupling verication and checkpointing,
and to analytically determine the best balance of verications between checkpoints so as to optimize
platform throughput. In our (realistic) model, silent errors are detected only when some verication
mechanism is executed. This approach is agnostic of the nature of this verication mechanism (check-
sum, error correcting code, coherence tests, etc.). This approach is also fully general-purpose, although
application-specic information, if available, can always be used to decrease the cost of verication.
The simplest protocol (see Figure 1) would be to perform a verication just before taking each
checkpoint. If the verication succeeds, then one can safely store the checkpoint and mark it as valid. If
the verication fails, then an error has struck since the last checkpoint, which was duly veried, and one
can safely recover from that checkpoint to resume the execution of the application. We point out that
this protocol with verications zeroes out the risk of a fatal error that would cause to restart execution
from scratch.
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Figure 1: The rst pattern with one verication before each checkpoint.
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Figure 2: The second pattern with three verications per checkpoint.
Of course there is room for optimization. Consider the second pattern illustrated in Figure 2 with
three verications per checkpoint. There are three chunks of size w, each followed by a verication.
Every third verication is followed by a checkpoint. We assume that w = W=3 to ensure that both
patterns correspond to the same amount of work, W. Just as for the rst pattern, a single checkpoint
needs to be kept in memory, owing to the verications. Also, as before, each error leads to re-executing
the work since the last checkpoint. But detection occurs much more rapidly in the second pattern, owing
to the intermediate verications. If the error strikes in the rst of the three chunks, it is detected by
the rst verication, and only the rst chunk is re-executed. Similarly, if the error strikes in the second
chunk (as illustrated in the gure), it is detected by the second verication, and the rst two chunks are
re-executed. The entire pattern of work needs to be re-executed only if the error strikes during the third
chunk. In average, the amount of work to re-execute is (1 + 2 + 3)w=3 = 2w = 2W=3. On the contrary,
2in the rst pattern of Figure 1, the amount of work to re-execute always is W, because the error is never
detected before the end of the pattern. Hence the second pattern leads to a 33% gain in re-execution
time. However, this comes at the price of three times as many verications. This overhead is paid in
every failure-free execution, and may be an overkill if the verication mechanism is too costly.
This little example shows that the optimization problem looks dicult. It can be stated as follows:
given the cost of checkpointing C, recovery R, and verication V , what is the optimal strategy to
minimize the (expectation of the) execution time? A strategy is a periodic pattern of checkpoints and
verications, interleaved with work segments, that repeats over time. The length of the work segments
also depends upon the platform MTBF . For example, with a single checkpoint and no verication
(which corresponds to the classical approach for fail-stop failures), the optimal length of the work segment
is known to be
p
2C (as given by Young [20]) or
p
2C( + R) (as given by Daly [6]). These well-known
formulas are rst-order approximations and are valid only if C;R   (in which case they collapse).
Given a periodic pattern with checkpoints and verications, can we extend these formulas and compute
similar approximations?
This paper is an important extension of [1], where the idea of coupling checkpoints and verications
was originally introduced. In [1], only two simple patterns were proposed and analyzed: one pattern
with k verications, 1 checkpoint, and k same-size chunks (as in the example of Figure 2), and another
pattern with k checkpoints, 1 verication, and k same-size chunks. These two imbalanced patterns were
chosen for simplicity. The rst pattern has much greater applicability, since a single checkpoint needs
to be kept in memory. The second pattern requires k checkpoints to be kept in memory simultaneously,
which is reasonable only for very small values of k. One major contribution of this paper is to analyze
arbitrary patterns where p checkpoints and q verications are interleaved, and where dierent-size chunks
are allowed.
Given values of C and V , and when the platform MTBF  is large in front of these parameters,
the cost of re-executing the work will dominate the waste due to failures. Here, the waste is dened
as the fraction of time during which the processors do not perform useful work. As already mentioned,
the waste due to failures must be traded-o with the waste incurred in a failure-free execution. In this
context, we succeed in characterizing the optimal pattern with p checkpoints and q verications, and we
show that this pattern regularly interleaves both checkpoints and verications across same-size chunks
(algorithm BalancedAlgorithm, see Figure 3 for an example with p = 2 and q = 5). This important
result fully characterizes the optimal strategy when  is large in front of the resilience parameters C, R
and V .
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Figure 3: The BalancedAlgorithm with ve verications for two checkpoints.
In addition, another important contribution of this paper is an exact computation of the waste for
an arbitrary pattern with p checkpoints and q verications, including the overhead of re-executing some
verications and recovering from invalid checkpoints when p;q  2. These exact values of the waste are
also compared through extensive simulations that involve realistic scenarios for petascale and exascale
platforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We survey related work in Section 2. We describe the
performance model in Section 3. We show how to compute the waste of an arbitrary pattern in Section 4.
In Section 5, we analyze the performance of a generic balanced algorithm, BalancedAlgorithm, which
equipartitions p checkpoints and q verications inside a pattern, for arbitrary values of p and q such that
p  q. In Section 6, we show that this algorithm is optimal when the platform MTBF  is large in front
of the resilience parameters C, R and V , and we explain how to choose the optimal pattern given a set
of parameters. In Section 7, we conduct several simulations that show the gain achieved by the balanced
algorithm over the base algorithm with p = q = 1. We provide nal remarks and hints for future work
in Section 8.
32 Related work
Most traditional approaches maintain a single checkpoint. If the checkpoint le includes errors, the
application faces an irrecoverable failure and must restart from scratch. This is because error detection
latency is ignored in traditional rollback and recovery schemes. These schemes assume instantaneous
error detection (therefore mainly targeting fail-stop failures) and are unable to accommodate silent
errors. We focus in this section on related work about silent errors. A comprehensive list of techniques
and references is provided by Lu, Zheng and Chien in [14].
Considerable eorts have been directed at error-checking to reveal silent errors. Error detection is
usually very costly. Hardware mechanisms, such as ECC memory, can detect and even correct a fraction
of errors, but in practice they are complemented with software techniques. The simplest technique
is triple modular redundancy and voting [15]. For high-performance scientic applications, process
replication (each process is equipped with a replica, and messages are quadruplicated) is proposed in
the RedMPI library [10]. Application-specic information can be very useful to enable ad-hoc solutions,
that dramatically decrease the cost of detection.
Many techniques have been advocated. They include memory scrubbing [13], but also ABFT tech-
niques [12, 3, 19], such as coding for the sparse-matrix vector multiplication kernel [19], and coupling a
higher-order with a lower-order scheme for PDEs [2]. These methods can only detect an error but do not
correct it. Self-stabilizing corrections after error detection in the conjugate gradient method are investi-
gated by Sao and Vuduc [18]. Also, Heroux and Hoemmen [11] design a fault-tolerant GMRES capable
of converging despite silent errors, and Bronevetsky and de Supinski [4] provide a comparative study of
detection costs for iterative methods. Elliot et al. [8] combine partial redundancy and checkpointing, and
conrm the benet of dual and triple redundancy. The drawback is that twice the number of processing
resources is required (for dual redundancy).
As already mentioned, our work is agnostic of the underlying error-detection technique and takes
the cost of verication as an input parameter to the model. To the best of our knowledge, the closest
work is the preliminary study in [1], which we considerably extend by considering arbitrary patterns and
dierent size chunks, as explained in Section 1.
3 Performance model
In this section, we introduce a performance model to assess the eciency of any checkpoint/verication
pattern. We enforce resilience through the use of a periodic pattern with p checkpoints and q verications,
and whose total length is S = pC + qV + W. Here, W is the work that is executed during the whole
pattern, and it is divided into several chunks that are each followed by a verication, or a checkpoint, or
both. Checkpoints are verications are at arbitrary location within the pattern. The only constraint is
that the pattern always ends by a verication immediately followed by a checkpoint: this is to enforce
that the last checkpoint is always valid, thereby ruling out the risk of a fatal failure. In the example of
Figure 2, we have three chunks of same size w, hence W = 3w and S = C + 3V + 3w. The example of
Figure 3 uses six chunks of size either w or 2w, for a total work W = 10w, and S = 2C +5V +10w. The
rationale for using such chunk sizes in Figure 3 is given in Section 5.
Consider a parallel application, and let Tbase be the base time of its execution without any over-
head due to resilience techniques (without loss of generality, assume unit-speed execution). We enforce
resilience through the use of the periodic pattern described above, with p checkpoints, q verications,
work W, and total length S = pC + qV + W. The problem is to compute the execution time of the
application when silent errors can strike during execution. The input parameters are the following:
 the cost V of the verication mechanism;
 the cost C of a checkpoint;
 the cost R of a recovery;
 the platform MTBF .
First, assume a fault-free execution of the application: every pattern of length S, only W units of
work are executed, hence the time T for a fault-free execution is T = S
W Tbase. Now, let Tnal denote the
4expectation of the execution time with silent errors taken into account. In average, errors occur every 
time-units. For each error, we lose F time-units in average (where F will be computed later), and there
are Tfinal
 errors during the execution. The value of F depends upon the pattern, see the examples below
and the full derivation in Section 5. Altogether, we derive that
Tnal = T +
Tnal

F; (1)
which we rewrite as
 
1 Waste

Tnal = Tbase;
with Waste = 1  
 
1  
F

 
1  
pC + qV
S

: (2)
The waste is the fraction of time where nodes do not perform useful computations. Minimizing execution
time is equivalent to minimizing the waste. In Equation (2), we identify two sources of overhead: (i) the
term Waste =
pC+qV
S , which is the waste due to checkpointing in a fault-free execution, by construction
of the algorithm; and (ii) the term Wastefail = F
, which is the waste due to errors striking during
execution. With these notations, we have
Waste = Wastefail + Waste   WastefailWaste: (3)
To fully characterize the eciency of a given pattern, there remains to determine F, the (expected)
time lost due to each failure. The value of F depends upon which pattern is used, and we compute it
for arbitrary values of p and q in Section 5. We now give two examples.
The rst example is for the simple protocol of Figure 1. We have p = q = 1, a single chunk of
size w = W, and a pattern of size S = C + V + W. Computing F for this pattern goes as follows:
whenever an error strikes, it is detected at the end of the work, during the verication. We rst recover
from the last checkpoint, then re-execute the entire work, and nally redo the verication. This leads to
F = R + W + V = R + S   C. From Equation (2) we derive that
Waste = 1  
 
1  
R + S   C

 
1  
C + V
S

= aS +
b
S
+ c; (4)
where a = 1
, b = (C +V )(1+ C R
 ) and c = R V  2C
 . The value that minimizes the waste is S = Sopt,
and the optimal waste is Wasteopt, where
Sopt =
r
b
a
=
p
(C + V )( + C   R) and Wasteopt = 2
p
ab + c: (5)
We point out that this approach leads to a rst-order approximation of the optimal pattern, not to
an optimal value. This is because we have neglected the possibility of having more than one error within
a pattern. In fact, this approach is valid when  is large in front of S (and of all parameters R, C and
V ). When this is the case, we derive that Sopt 
p
(C + V ) and Wasteopt  2
q
C+V
 . It is very
interesting to make a comparison with Young's or Daly's formula for the optimal checkpointing period
Topt when dealing with fatal failures: their formula writes Topt 
p
2C. In essence, the factor 2 comes
from the fact that we re-execute only half the period in average with a fatal failure, because the detection
is instantaneous. In our case, we always have to re-execute the entire pattern. And of course, we have
to replace C by C + V , to account for the cost of the verication mechanism.
The second example is for the BalancedAlgorithm illustrated in Figure 3. We have p = 2, q = 5,
six chunks of size w or 2w, W = 10w, and a pattern of size S = 2C + 5V + W. Note that it may now
be the case that we store an invalid checkpoint, if the error strikes during the third chunk (of size w,
just before the non-veried checkpoint), and therefore we must keep two checkpoints in memory to avoid
the risk of fatal failures. When the verication is done at the end of the fourth chunk, if it is correct,
then we can mark the preceding checkpoint as valid and keep only this checkpoint in memory. Because
q > p, there are never two consecutive checkpoints without a verication between them, and at most two
checkpoints need to be kept in memory.
The time lost due to an error depends upon where it strikes:
5 With probability 2w=W, the error strikes in the rst chunk. It is detected by the rst verication,
and the time lost is R + 2w + V , since we recover, and re-execute the work and the verication.
 With probability 2w=W, the error strikes in the second chunk. It is detected by the second
verication, and the time lost is R + 4w + 2V , since we recover, re-execute the work and both
verications.
 With probability w=W, the error strikes in the third chunk. It is detected by the third verication,
and we roll back to the last checkpoint, recover and verify it. We nd it invalid, because the
error struck before taking it. We roll back to the beginning of the pattern and recover from that
checkpoint. The time lost is 2R + 6w + C + 4V , since we recover twice, re-execute the work up to
the third verication, re-do the checkpoint and the three verications, and add the verication of
the invalid checkpoint.
 With probability w=W, the error strikes in the fourth chunk. It is detected by the third verication.
We roll back to the previous checkpoint, recover and verify it. In this case, it is valid, since the
error struck after the checkpoint. The time lost is R + w + 2V .
 With probability 2w=W, the error strikes in the fth chunk. Because there was a valid verication
after the checkpoint, we do not need to verify it again, and the time lost is R + 3w + 2V .
 With probability 2w=W, the error strikes in the sixth and last chunk. A similar reasoning shows
that the time lost is R + 5w + 3V .
Averaging over all cases, we derive that F = 11R
10 + 35w
10 + C
10 + 22V
10 . We then proceed as with the rst
example to derive the optimal size S of the pattern. We optain Sopt =
q
b
a and Wasteopt = 2
p
ab+c (see
Equation (5)), where a =
7
20, b = (2C +5V )(1  1
20(22R 12C +9V )) and c = 1
20(22R 26C  17V ).
When  is large, we have Sopt 
q
20
7 (2C + 5V ) and Wasteopt  2
q
7(2C+5V )
20 .
These examples are intended to prepare the reader for the computation of the waste in the general
case. This computation is conducted in Section 4. Also, the examples are helpful to introduce the
analysis of the waste when the platform MTBF  is large in front of all resilience parameters R, C and V
(Section 4.2).
4 Computing the waste
In this section, we generalize from the examples and provide a generic expression for the waste (Sec-
tion 4.1). Then we derive the dominant term when the platform MTBF  is large in front of all resilience
parameters R, C and V (Section 4.2).
4.1 Exact expression
Consider a general pattern of size S = pC + qV + W, with p  q. Recall from Equation (3) that the
total waste is Waste = Waste +Wastefail  WasteWastefail, where Waste is the waste without
failures, that is the fraction of the time spent to do useless work each period, and Wastefail is the
waste due to errors striking during execution. We have Waste = off
S , where o = pC + qV is the
fault-free overhead due to inserting p checkpoints and q verications within the pattern. We also have
Wastefail = F
, where F is the time lost each time an error strikes.
The time lost F includes two components: re-executing a fraction of the total work W of the pattern,
and computing additional verications, checkpoints and recoveries (see both examples in Section 3). The
general form of F is thus F = freW +  where fre stands for fraction of work that is re-executed due to
failures;  is a constant that is a linear combination of C, V and R. For the rst example (Figure 1),
we have fre = 1. For the second example (Figure 3), we have fre = 7
20 (recall that w = W=10).
For convenience, we use an equivalent form
F = freS + ; (6)
6where  =    fre(pC + QV ) is another constant. Plugging this expression back into the waste, we can
generalize Equation (4) and derive that Waste = aS + b
S + c, where
a =
fre

; b = o

1  



; and c =
1

(   ofre):
We then compute Sopt =
q
b
a and Wasteopt = 2
p
ab+c as before. There remains to compute fre and ,
which is done in Section 5 for the general case of BalancedAlgorithm.
A word of caution. This approach is valid only when the length of the pattern S = pC+qV +pqw is
small in front of the MTBF : we need to enforce S  . Indeed, we made a rst-order approximation
when implicitly assuming that we do not have more than one failure during the same period. This
hypothesis is required to allow the expression of the model in a closed form. In fact, the number
of failures during a pattern of length S can be modeled as a Poisson process of parameter S
; the
probability of having k  0 failures is 1
k!(S
)ke
  S
. Hence the probability of having two or more failures
is  = 1 (1+ S
)e
  S
. For instance, enforcing the constraint S  0:1 leads to   0:005, hence a valid
approximation when capping S to that value. Indeed, we have overlapping faults every 200 periods in
average, so that our model is accurate for 99:5% of the checkpointing segments, hence it is quite reliable.
In addition to the previous constraint, we must enforce the condition S  pC +qV , because the number
of intervals and interval lengths are positive. The optimal value of S must therefore be chosen in the
interval [pC + qV; 0:1].
4.2 When  is large
When the platform MTBF  is large in front of all resilience parameters R, C and V , we can identify the
dominant term in the optimal waste Wasteopt. Indeed, in that case, the constant  becomes negligible
in front of , and we derive that
Sopt =
r
o
fre

p
 + o(
p
); (7)
and that the optimal waste is
Wasteopt = 2
p
ofre
r
1

+ o(
r
1

): (8)
This equation shows that the optimal pattern when  is large is obtained when the product ofre is
minimal. This calls for a trade-o, as a smaller value of o with few checkpoints and verications leads
to a larger re-execution time, hence to a larger value of fre.
We will use this characterization in terms of the product ofre (and extend it to dierent-size chunks)
to derive the optimal pattern in Section 6. For instance, coming back to the examples of Figures 1 and 3,
we readily see that the second pattern is better than the rst one for large values of  whenever V > 2C=5,
which corresponds to the condition 7
20  (5V + 2C) > 1  (V + C).
5 The balanced algorithm
In this section, we analyze the generic balanced algorithm BalancedAlgorithm to place p checkpoints
and q verications for given values of W, p and q. As discussed before, we assume that p  q, so that no
more than two checkpoints need to be kept in memory at each time. Then, we explain how to compute
the optimal total workload W, given the parameters , V , C and R.
When p = 1, the algorithm follows the pattern illustrated in Figure 2 for q = 3: the total workload W
is divided into q intervals of equal size w = W=q. The rst q   1 intervals are followed only by a
verication, while the last interval is followed both by a checkpoint and a verication. With this pattern,
note that only one checkpoint is kept in memory at all time, because the checkpoint is always veried
by a verication immediately preceding it.
7Other cases are such that p > 1 and p does not divide q; otherwise, we are back to the previous
case with 1 checkpoint and q=p verications. The idea is then to equally space each checkpoint and
each verication, as was done in the pattern of Figure 3. Hence, we divide the total workload into p  q
same-size intervals of size w = W=pq. Some intervals may be ended neither by a checkpoint nor by
a verication, hence we end up for instance with chunks of size 2w in the example. Then, we place
checkpoints at the end of intervals iq, for 1  i  p, and verications at the end of intervals j p, for
1  j  q. If both a checkpoint and a verication happen at the end of the same interval (this is always
the case for the last interval p  q), then the checkpoint follows the verication. With this pattern,
however, some intervals are ended only with a checkpoint, and hence this checkpoint is not veried.
Therefore, we need to keep two checkpoints in memory while there has not been a valid verication after
the non-veried checkpoint.
Next, we compute the waste in both cases (p = 1 and p > 1), as a function of p;q, the interval
lengths w. As explained in Section 4, we have o = pC + qV and we only need to compute F, the
expectation of the amount of time spent to recover from a failure.
5.1 Computing F with p = 1
We rst consider that p = 1. Recall that the total workload is divided into q intervals of size w. Consider
that the failure strikes in interval i, with 1  i  q. Then F(i) = R + i(w + V ): we need to recover
from the failure, and we go back to the checkpoint (that was already veried) at the end of the previous
period, hence we need to redo i intervals with their verications. Therefore, because the probability that
the error strikes during an interval is 1=q, we obtain
F(w;1;q) =
1
q
q X
i=1
(R + i(w + V )) = R +
q + 1
2
(w + V ) =
q + 1
2
w + c1(q);
with c1(q) = R +
q+1
2 V .
Finally, note that if p = q = 1, we have w = W and we obtain the same result as in Section 3:
F(w;1;1) = w + R + V :
5.2 Computing F with p > 1
We compute the time lost F(i) if failure strikes during interval i, for 1  i  pq. We express i as
i = ap + b; i = a0q + b0;
by making an euclidian division by p and q. For instance, a = bi=pc and b = i mod p.
Recall that checkpoints occur at the end of intervals `  q, for 1  `  p, and verications occur at
the end of intervals `0  p, for 1  `0  q. Therefore, the rst verication following i occurs at the end
of interval NV (i) (next verication), where
NV (i) =

ap if b = 0
(a + 1)p otherwise
Also, the rst checkpoint preceding i occurs at the end of interval PC(i) (preceding checkpoint),
where
PC(i) =

(a0   1)q if b0 = 0
a0q otherwise
Intervals PC(i) + 1 to NV (i) will therefore need to be re-executed, because the failure is detected
at the end of interval NV (i), and the rst valid checkpoint from which we will recover is at the end of
interval PC(i). We need to compute the number of verications and checkpoints that occur during these
intervals, that will have to be redone. Let NbV (i) be the number of verications between PC(i) + 1
and NV (i), and NbC(i) be the number of checkpoints between PC(i)+1 and NV (i) 1 (a checkpoint at
the end of interval NV (i) will not be re-executed or loaded, because the verication occurs just before).
For the number of verications, let PC(i) + 1 = cp + d (euclidian division) and NV (i) = a00p (where
a00 = a or a00 = a + 1). If d = 0, then NbV (i) = a00   c0 + 1, otherwise NbV (i) = a00   c0. For the
8number of checkpoints, let NV (i) 1 = c0q+d0 (euclidian division). Then, NbC(i) = c0 a0+1 if b0 = 0,
and NbC(i) = c0   a0 otherwise. Note that we count the number of checkpoints between i and NV (i),
because there are no additional checkpoints between PC(i) + 1 and i, by denition of PC(i).
Let Int(x) be a function returning 0 if x is an integer, and 1 otherwise. Indeed, for the rst checkpoint
from which we recover (at the end of PC(i)), we need to verify it only if it was not already veried, i.e.,
if PC(i)=p is not an integer. Finally we can express F(i):
F(i) = (NV (i)   PC(i))w + NbV (i)  V + NbC(i)  (R + V + C) + R + Int(PC(i)=p)V .
(NV (i) PC(i))w corresponds to the re-executed work; NbV (i)V corresponds to the re-executed
verications (including the last one at the end of interval NV (i)); NbC(i)  (R + V + C) corresponds
to the checkpoints from which we recover, between i and NV (i) (none of them are already veried by
denition of NV (i), and therefore we pay R+V +C for each of them); and nally R corresponds to the
actual recovery from PC(i), plus an eventual verication cost if this checkpoint was not already veried
(i.e., if PC(i)=p is not an integer).
By summing over all intervals, since the probabilities that the failure strikes in an interval are evenly
balanced and equal to 1=pq, we obtain the time lost with BalancedAlgorithm:
F(w;p;q) =
1
pq
pq X
i=1
(NV (i)   PC(i))w + NbV (i)  V + NbC(i)  (R + V + C) + R + Int(PC(i)=p)V:
Note that with p = 1, we have NV (i) = NbV (i) = i, PC(i) = NvC(i) = 0, and Int(PC(i)=p) = 0,
hence we obtain the same formula as in Section 5.1.
6 Asymptotic analysis
In this section, we focus on the case where the MTBF  is large in front of the resilience parameters C, R
and V . Recall from Equation (8) that the optimal waste is Wasteopt = 2
p
ofre
q
1
 +o(
q
1
). Consider
a given pattern with p checkpoints and q verications, where p  q. We have o(p;q) = pC + qV and
we aim at minimizing fre(p;q), the expected fraction of the work that is re-executed. The major result
of this section is that fre(p;q) is minimized when the pattern has pq same-size intervals and when the
checkpoints and verications are equally spaced among these intervals as in the BalancedAlgorithm,
in which case fre(p;q) =
p+q
2pq . We rst prove this important result for p = 1 in Section 6.1 before moving
to the general case in Section 6.2. Finally, we explain how to choose the optimal pattern given values of
C and V in Section 6.3.
6.1 Computing fre when p = 1
Theorem 1. The minimal value of fre(1;q) is obtained for same-size chunks and it is fre(1;q) =
q+1
2q .
Proof. For q = 1, we already know from Section 3 that fre(1;1) = 1. Consider a pattern with q  2
verications, executing a total work W. Let iW be the size of the i-th chunk, where
Pq
i=1 i = 1
(see Figure 4). We compute the expected fraction of work that is re-executed when a failure strikes the
pattern as follows. With probability i, the failure strikes in the i-th chunk. The error is detected by
the i-th verication, we roll back to the beginning of the pattern, so we re-execute the rst i chunks.
Altogether, the amount of work that is re-executed is
Pq
i=1

i
Pi
j=1 jW

, hence
fre(1;q) =
q X
i=1
0
@i
i X
j=1
j
1
A: (9)
What is the minimal value of fre(1;q) in Equation (9) under the constraint
Pq
i=1 i = 1? We rewrite
fre(1;q) =
1
2
  q X
i=1
i
!2
+
1
2
q X
i=1
2
i =
1
2
 
1 +
q X
i=1
2
i
!
;
and by convexity, we see that fre is minimal when all the i's have the same value 1=q. In that case, we
derive that fre(1;q) = 1
2(1 +
Pq
i=1
1
q2) =
q+1
2q , which concludes the proof.
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Figure 4: A pattern with dierent-size chunks, for p = 1 and q = 3.
When p = 1, BalancedAlgorithm uses q same-size chunks. Theorem 1 shows that this is optimal.
6.2 Computing fre when p  1
Theorem 2. For a pattern with p  1, the minimal value of fre(p;q) is fre(p;q) =
p+q
2pq , and it is obtained
with the BalancedAlgorithm.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary pattern with p checkpoints, q  p verications and total work W. The
repartition of the checkpoints and verications is unknown, and dierent-size chunks can be used. The
only assumption is that the pattern ends by a verication followed by a checkpoint.
The main idea of the proof is to compare the gain in re-execution time due to the p 1 intermediate
checkpoints. Let f
(p)
re be the fraction of work that is re-executed for the pattern, and let f
(1)
re be the
fraction of work that is re-executed for the same pattern, but where the p 1 rst checkpoints have been
suppressed. Clearly, f
(p)
re is smaller than f
(1)
re , because the additional checkpoints save some roll-backs,
and we aim at maximizing their dierence.
Time 1W 2W 3W
V C C C V C
Figure 5: A pattern with dierent-size chunks, with 3 checkpoints (we do not show where intermediate
verications are located).
In the original pattern, let iW be the amount of work before the i-th checkpoint, for 1  i  p (and
with
Pp
i=1 i = 1). See Figure 5 for an example with p = 3. What is the gain due to the presence of
the p   1 intermediate checkpoints? If an error strikes before the rst checkpoint, which happens with
probability 1, there is no gain, because we always rollback from the beginning of the pattern. This is
true regardless of the number and repartition of the q verications in the pattern. If an error strikes after
the rst checkpoint and before the second one, which happens with probability 2, we do have a gain:
instead of rolling back to the beginning of the pattern, we roll-back only to the rst checkpoint, which
saves 1W units of re-executed work. Again, This is true regardless of the number and repartition of
the q verications in the pattern. For the general case, if an error strikes after the (i   1)-th checkpoint
and before the i-th one, which happens with probability i, the gain is
Pi 1
j=1 jW. We derive that
f(1)
re   f(p)
re =
p X
i=1
0
@i
i 1 X
j=1
j
1
A:
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, we have
p X
i=1
0
@i
i 1 X
j=1
j
1
A =
1
2
0
@
  p X
i=1
i
!2
 
p X
i=1
2
i
1
A =
1
2
 
1  
p X
i=1
2
i
!
and by convexity, the dierence f
(1)
re  f
(p)
re is maximal when i = 1=p for all i. In that latter case, f
(1)
re  
f
(p)
re =
Pp
i=1(i   1)=p2 = (p   1)=p2. This results shows that the checkpoints should be equipartitioned
in the pattern, regardless of the location of the verications.
To conclude the proof, we now use Theorem 1: to minimize the value of f
(1)
re , we should equipartition
the verications too. In that case, we have f
(1)
re =
q+1
2q and f
(p)
re =
q+1
2q  
p 1
2p =
q+p
2pq , which concludes
the proof.
10Theorem 2 shows that BalancedAlgorithm is the optimal pattern with p checkpoints and q
verications when  is large. An important consequence of this result is that we never need to keep more
than two checkpoints in memory when p  q, because it is optimal to regularly interleave checkpoints
and verications.
6.3 Choosing the optimal pattern
Assume that V = C, where 0 <   1. Then, the product ofre can be expressed as
ofre =
p + q
2pq
(pC + qV ) = C 
p + q
2

1
q
+

p

:
Therefore, given a value of C and a value of V , i.e., , the goal is to minimize the function
p+q
2

1
q +

p

with 1  p  q, and p;q taking integer values.
Let p =   q. Then we aim at minimizing
1 + 
2

1 +



=

2
+

2
+
1 + 
2
;
and we obtain opt =
p
 =
q
V
C.
For instance, for V = 4 and C = 9, we obtain opt = 2
3, and a pattern with p = 2 and q = 3 is
optimal. However, if V = C, then opt = 1 and the best solution is the base algorithm with p = q = 1.
In practice, opt may not be rational and we need to nd good approximations of p and q in order tot
minimize the asymptotical waste. A solution is to try all reasonable values of q, say from 1 to 50, and
to compute the asymptotic waste achieved with p1 = b  qc and p2 = d  qe, hence testing at most
100 congurations (p;q). One can even further constrain the value of q if the capping of S is exceeded
(see discussion in Section 4.1).
7 Simulation results
The BalancedAlgorithm has been implemented and simulations have been conducted in Maple for
a wide range of scenarios. We discuss these scenarios in Section 7.1, which is devoted to describ-
ing the simulation framework. In Section 7.2, we present the results, outlining the gain achieved by
BalancedAlgorithm over the base case (where p = q = 1) , and deriving main conclusions from these
simulations.
The Maple sheet is publicly available at [16], and users are invited to instantiate the model with their
preferred parameters.
7.1 Simulation framework
This section provides information about the parameters used for instantiating the performance model
for the BalancedAlgorithm. We have chosen realistic parameters that depict large-scale platforms.
There are three main scenarios for dierent values of C. In each scenario, we use ve dierent platform
MTBFs and ve values for the ratio  = V=C (where V  C). We report the values p and q resulting
in optimal pattern, the optimal waste, the waste due to base algorithm, and the gain (in %) achieved.
We take C = R = f600;300;100g seconds. For a component MTBF of 100 years, we have considered
ve dierent platforms with the total number of nodes = f102;103;104;105;106g, which correspond to
a platform MTBF  ranging from  = 100  365  24=100 = 8760 hours (365 days) down to  =
3153:6 sec ( 52 min). For each , results are reported for 12 dierent  = V=C ratios, where  =
0:025;0:05;0:1;0:2;:::;1. Since opt may not be rational, in order to nd integral values of popt and qopt
we test all possible congurations such that 1  p  q  10 to arrive at p and q with the minimal waste.
We used Maple to analytically compute the waste and to plot the gain achieved over the base case.
117.2 Results and analysis
Based on the above framework, in this section we report the results through six plots in Figure 6 and a
table of values in Table 1.
Regarding the accuracy of our model and the computation of waste values, we make the following
statements:
1. For the platform with 106 nodes when C = 600, Sopt lies in the interval [pC +qV; 0:6]. So in this
case our model is accurate for 88% of the checkpointing segments. For C = 300 and 100, Sopt is
less than 0:4 (94% accuracy) and 0:2 (98% accuracy) respectively.
2. For the platform with 105 nodes, Sopt always lies in the interval [pC + qV; 0:2]. For all other
platforms, Sopt  0:1.
Figure 6 provides an overall view of the performance of the BalancedAlgorithm and gives an
insight into the behavior of this algorithm for dierent values of the resilience parameters C, R and V .
Table 1 provides, for C = 600, gain values for  ranging from 0:025 to 1 with the best pattern and
the corresponding waste when  is xed. Each plot, representative of a certain V=C ratio, reports
gain of the optimal pattern over the base case for C = 600, 300 and 100 as a function of the platform
MTBF  (plotted on a log scale). Plots show that the maximum gain achieved is 19:05% for  = 0:025
when C = 100 for a platform having 100 nodes. In every plot, it can be observed that gain drops as
the number of nodes increases. This is to be expected, since an increase in failure-prone processing
elements would reduce the mean time to failure. This shortens Sopt roughly by one-third with every
ten-fold increase in nodes as Sopt / 1=p
p
N, where N is the number of nodes and p is the number of
checkpoints on the optimal pattern. Thus, the optimal pattern reduces to the base case pattern in such
large congurations.
In Table 1, it can also be observed that an increase in the cost of verication leads the gain to drop
drastically, as quickly as   0:3 for a platform with 106 nodes and as slowly as   0:8 for a platform
with 102 nodes. This corroborates with Equation (8). An increase in the cost of verication, as well as in
the number of verications and checkpoints, leads to a larger value of o. The BalancedAlgorithm,
by construction, distributes q=p verications every checkpoint. We see that this results into 6 verications
in the best case giving fre = 0:58, and 1 verication in the worst case (base case) giving fre = 0:1. Since
o as well as fre increases, waste increases and optimal pattern approaches the base case.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit traditional checkpointing strategies in the context of silent data corruption errors.
These are latent errors that cannot be detected immediately because they are identied only when the
corrupted data is activated. Strategies by Young and Daly [20, 6] cannot be relied upon because they
assume instantaneous error detection. Due to occurrence of silent errors, the checkpoint taken during the
computation may not be used to recover as it might itself be a corrupted checkpoint. In order to safely
recover from a checkpoint, we must ensure that the error occurred after this checkpoint. This can be
done with an error detection mechanism that periodically performs a verication. To incorporate this,
we devised an algorithm, called BalancedAlgorithm, coupling verication and checkpointing so that
verication checks whether there is an error or not. If there is no error, then the previous checkpoint
can be marked as valid. Otherwise, we recover from the previous checkpoint; if this was not a validated
checkpoint, then we add a verication just after recovery to check whether this checkpoint is valid, and
go back to the preceding checkpoint if it is not valid. The algorithm produces a repetitive periodic
pattern of equally-spaced checkpoints and equally-spaced verications, interleaved with work segments.
Periodicity is governed by the number of checkpoints and verications that can be executed within each
pattern. When there are more verications than checkpoints, this pattern obviates the need to keep
more than two checkpoints in memory.
We have also presented a performance model to assess the eciency of any checkpoint/verication
pattern. This model provides an expression for the exact computation of the optimal pattern as well
as the optimal waste for any combination of checkpoints and verications. We establish the fact that
when MTBF  is large in front of all resilience parameters R, C and V , the optimal waste is obtained
12(a)  = 0:025 (b)  = 0:05 (c)  = 0:075
(d)  = 0:1 (e)  = 0:2 (f)  = 0:3
Figure 6: Gain (in % on y-axis) achieved, for optimal values of p and q over the base case p = q = 1
when C = 600 (10 minutes), C = 300 (5 minutes) and C = 100 ( 1:6 minutes) as a function of the
platform MTBF  (on log scale on x-axis) for six dierent V=C ratios.
by minimizing the product of two negatively correlated variables o (fault-free overhead) and fre (re-
executed fraction of work due to failures). The performance model has been applied to analyze the
generic BalancedAlgorithm. For xed values of p and q, and hence with o = pC + qV , we have
proved that fre is minimized when the pattern has pq same-size intervals and when the checkpoints and
verications are equally spaced among these intervals. Thus, we conclude that BalancedAlgorithm
produces an optimal pattern with p checkpoints and q verications. Finally, we demonstrate how to
choose the optimal pattern for dierent verication and checkpointing costs. We found that a pattern
with p checkpoints and q verications is optimal when p=q =
p
V=C. Therefore, if V = C, then it is
worth doing a verication immediately followed by checkpoint only at the end of the pattern, that is,
obtaining a base pattern with p = q = 1.
We have instantiated the performance model with realistic parameters, and we have compared the
BalancedAlgorithm with the case p = q = 1. Simulation results show a maximum gain of up to
19% and ndings corroborate the theoretical analysis. Overall, we have analytically determined the best
balance of verications between checkpoints so as to optimize platform throughput for given costs of R,
C and V , we proved that the balanced algorithm produces an optimal pattern, and we evaluated this
algorithm for multiple scenarios.
We focused in this work on cases where V  C, hence with more verications than checkpoints, but
all results hold in the symmetrical case where C  V . However, we did not detail these results because
they would imply to keep more than two checkpoints in memory, which may be dicult.
A future research direction would be to consider dierent kinds of applications, such as graphs of
computational tasks where checkpoints and verications could be taken at the end of a task. It would
13then not be possible to regularly interleave checkpoints and verications anymore, and new strategies to
decide where to place checkpoints and verications would have to be designed.
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15C = 600

=
1
0
0
y
=
1
0
2
 popt;qopt Wasteopt Wastebase Gain (in %)
0:025 1;6 0:007140 0:008812 18:97
0:05 2;9 0:007543 0:008919 15:4
0:1 1;3 0:008111 0:009129 11:15
0:2 4;9 0:008922 0:009534 6:42
0:3 1;2 0:009538 0:009922 3:9
0:4 2;3 0:010062 0:010295 2:27
0:5 2;3 0:010522 0:010656 1:25
0:6 3;4 0:010940 0:011004 0:58
0:7 5;6 0:011326 0:011342 0:14
0:8 1;1 0:011670 0:011670 0
0:9 1;1 0:011989 0:011989 0
1:0 1;1 0:012299 0:012299 0

=
1
0
0
y
=
1
0
3
0:025 1;6 0:022545 0:027734 18:7
0:05 1;4 0:023818 0:028068 15:1
0:1 1;3 0:025579 0:028724 10:94
0:2 1;2 0:028115 0:029992 6:3
0:3 1;2 0:030038 0:031207 3:7
0:4 2;3 0:031738 0:032375 1:96
0:5 2;3 0:033185 0:033501 0:94
0:6 3;4 0:034532 0:034591 0:17
0:7 1;1 0:035645 0:035645 0
0:8 1;1 0:036669 0:036669 0
0:9 1;1 0:037664 0:037664 0
1:0 1;1 0:038633 0:038633 0

=
1
0
0
y
=
1
0
4
0:025 1;6 0:070931 0:086370 17:9
0:05 1;4 0:074809 0:087393 14:4
0:1 1;3 0:080173 0:089402 10:3
0:2 1;2 0:087848 0:093281 5:8
0:3 1;2 0:093734 0:096992 3:4
0:4 1;2 0:099244 0:100557 1:3
0:5 1;1 0:103990 0:103990 0
0:6 1;1 0:107303 0:107303 0
0:7 1;1 0:110509 0:110509 0
0:8 1;1 0:113616 0:113616 0
0:9 1;1 0:116633 0:116633 0
1:0 1;1 0:119567 0:119567 0

=
1
0
0
y
=
1
0
5
0:025 1;6 0:219985 0:259794 15:3
0:05 1;4 0:230920 0:262704 12:1
0:1 1;3 0:245857 0:268405 8:4
0:2 1;2 0:266787 0:279368 4:5
0:3 1;2 0:283405 0:289805 2:2
0:4 1;2 0:298839 0:299776 0:31
0:5 1;1 0:309330 0:309330 0
0:6 1;1 0:318508 0:318508 0
0:7 1;1 0:327345 0:327345 0
0:8 1;1 0:335870 0:335870 0
0:9 1;1 0:344110 0:344110 0
1:0 1;1 0:352085 0:352085 0

=
1
0
0
y
=
1
0
6
0:025 1;6 0:631979 0:688195 8:2
0:05 1;4 0:6567004 0:694144 5:4
0:1 1;2 0:684016 0:705668 3:1
0:2 1;2 0:720191 0:727326 0:98
0:3 1;1 0:747322 0:747322 0
0:4 1;1 0:765844 0:765844 0
0:5 1;1 0:783046 0:783046 0
0:6 1;1 0:799061 0:799061 0
0:7 1;1 0:813996 0:813996 0
0:8 1;1 0:827946 0:827946 0
0:9 1;1 0:840992 0:840992 0
1:0 1;1 0:853205 0:853205 0
Table 1: Optimal values of p and q and the corresponding waste with gain over the base case when C is
xed at 600 and  varies from 0:025 to 1:0 for ve diferent values of .
16